A deep financial and economic crisis
Lebanon, host to some 1,3 million Syrian refugees, has been for a few months in the grip of a very deep financial and economic crises. The Lebanese lira, officially pegged to the dollar, has lost nearly 30% of its value since August 2019 in the informal exchange rate. Scarcity of hard currency is hitting hard key imports, vital in an import-dependent economy. The economic recession is estimated to be at 7% for 2019. Local economists estimate at 20 billion dollars the package needed to rescue the economy, while according to the new finance minister, 4 to billion dollars are urgently needed for imports of wheat, fuel and medicine.
The current crises has hit very hard ordinary Lebanese. More than one hundred thousand jobs have been lost. Prices have surged at least 9%, according to the World Food Programme. The World Bank estimates that the current poverty rate may well surge from the current 30% to 50% of the Lebanese population should the crises persist. Shop owners, suppliers and landlords increasingly demand to be paid in dollars. At the same time, capital controls, meant to protect the official exchange rate, force ordinary Lebanese to queue long hours at banks for the limited amount of dollars they are allowed to withdraw from their own hard-earned savings. This has led to intense feelings of frustration and humiliation.
How is the crisis affecting Syrian refugees?
The crisis has, obviously, affected Syrian refugees in myriad ways. Thousands have lost their jobs, or seen their salaries cut and the rent for their flimsy makeshift shelters increased. Bank restrictions also mean that refugees need to travel longer distances to collect cash assistance. Access to health care has also been impeded by scarcity of medication.
Fast growing poverty is having acute side effects. There are reportedly increased number of children working in the streets, working conditions deteriorate and signs of neglect increase. Tensions between refugees and landlords are compounded by refugees´inability to pay rent as well as new taxes, all resulting in increased evictions from informal tented settlements. A feeling of distress and despair is prevalent, including fears of deportation or conflict and even triggering flashbacks of traumatic experiences while in Syria.
Relations with the host community in the Bekaa
Before delving into the complex issue of host community relations in the Bekaa valley, a few clarifications need to be made. During the current crises the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese population has chosen not to make of refugees scapegoats of the economic crisis. Many expressions of solidarity with refugees have also appeared. In this, the Lebanese are setting an example to the rest of the world. In much of the West, in much more favourable economic conditions and with a much lower proportion of refugees, vast sectors of public opinion as well as political leaders have nakedly used refugees as ammunition for political gain.
The historical and emotional links between Syria and Lebanon are obviously deep and complex in the Bekaa valley. The Syrian army left the Bekaa only in 2005, and memories run deep. Instances of rejection of refugees are not uncommon. This being said, the Bekaa economy (in particular construction and agriculture) would quickly run to a standstill without Syrian workers, who were present in the valley in their thousands well before the Syrian crisis. Family and economic links are often strong. Thus, tensions linked to the presence of Syrians have long been much more related to the economy, in particular scarcity of resources, services and employment, rather than to any political or confessional differences.
Restrictive measures, such as curfews, checkpoints and raids, are common in the Bekaa, and likely to increase with the current crises. However, on the whole, at the local level law enforcement agencies as well as administrative authorities have treated Syrian refugees decently, and have oftentimes gone beyond the call of duty to assist or protect the most vulnerable and reduce tensions.
This being said, the current crises is obviously putting a strain into Lebanese-refugee relations. Every winter, UNHCR assists most Syrian refugee families with extra 375 USD to buy fuel and other supplies to face the harsh Lebanese winter. This winter’s assistance campaign has coincided with the onset of the economic crises. Bank restrictions in parts of the Bekaa valley have led to long queues of Syrian refugees in other parts of the valley, to collect their winter or monthly cash assistance. This has caused tensions with local communities, and led to the perception that the humanitarian community is unjustly prioritizing foreigners for assistance – while many elderly and vulnerable Lebanese are themselves in deep poverty and unable to buy fuel, medicine or food.
Municipalities in the Bekaa have been particularly hard hit by the crises. Many have not received their regular allocation by the Independent Municipal Fund since 2017. The crises has only deepened tax collection and scarcity of services, while vulnerable Lebanese increasingly turn to municipal authorities for social assistance. Some municipal authorities are growing impatient with the impact of the refugee presence on social services and resources, such as water, electricity, land use and garbage collection. It needs to be kept in mind that in some municipalities in the Bekaa, more than 50% of the population are Syrian refugees.
How is UNHCR responding
UNHCR has reacted very quickly to the present situation, with a three-pronged approach.
Working around the clock, UNHCR has delivered so far more than one million USD of assistance to vulnerable Lebanese in the Bekaa valley. Fuel cards have been delivered to more than 6,000 vulnerable Lebanese families – working closely with local NGOs, civil society and faith-based organizations, and in coordination with Municipalities. All public hospitals in the Bekaa, as well as most primary health centres, have received fuel assistance. At national level, UNCHR is financing six months of imports of all key medicines for the whole country. UNHCR has also complemented UNICEF’s fuel assistance to primary schools in the Bekaa.
Intense advocacy efforts are also underway. Working with WFP, UNHCR is lobbying banks to open new ATMs in poorly served areas, to reduce the queues of refugees and therefore to mitigate tensions with local communities. UNHCR has also dramatically stepped up its dialogue and coordination with law enforcement agencies, mayors, Governors and faith leaders, to explain efforts to assist Lebanese and to obtain their advice and support on how to reduce tensions.
Coordination has proven challenging, but progress is underway. Most humanitarian agencies in the Bekaa benefit host communities through development projects or inclusion in services, and contribute with hundreds of jobs to the local economy. However, before the onset of the current crises there had not been a history of widespread material assistance to Lebanese households.
Recently, and working within the Lebanon Crises Response Plan (LCRP), UN agencies such as WFP, UNDP and UNICEF, together with the Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum have stepped up efforts to coordinate assistance to Lebanese, within the current coordination system. This includes improving targeting and eliminating duplications, as well as organizing joint visits to Governors to better explain our efforts, together with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. In an interesting development, UNHCR is also supporting local NGOs such as Himaya in their innovative coordination efforts in Zahle and Baalbek, in conjuction with their respective Municipalities.
On an important note, the bulk of additional work to assist vulnerable Lebanese is undertaken by local personnel within humanitarian agencies – deeply affected themselves by the crisis, and without additional human resources. The potential for an increase in stress and frustration among humanitarian workers is a reality. UNHCR has undertaken national consultations to address sources of stress in front-line humanitarian workers, to ensure also better treatment of refugees. In our Bekaa office, a Staff Welfare Plan is also being prepared.
What more needs to be done?
In the midst of a very volatile and complex situation, there are a few certainties. First, the current crises is not going to go away anytime soon and poverty, restricted access to services and a feeling of oppression and humiliation will increase in the following months among Lebanese and Syrian refugees alike. Second, in the absence of quick solutions in the short term, and well-thought interventions in the mid- and long term, tensions around the presence of Syrian refugees may well become more acute. Third, the intense efforts made by humanitarian agencies to spread more assistance to Lebanese, as a matter of social justice and mitigation of tensions, are not sustainable with the available human and material resources.
Here are a few thoughts on how the international community should respond to this situation.
There needs to be a thorough do no harm analysis in reforms requested by the international community as conditions for financial aid, and in the modalities for their implementation. An interesting example of this is electricity reform. A good deal of electricity consumption in informal tented settlements, where 40% of the refugee population in the Bekaa live, is informal. Refugees pay directly the landlord or the municipality and only some families can afford individual meters.
Now, in its statement of 23 January, the International Support Group for Lebanon calls for reform of the electricity sector, and reaffirms its willingness to support a Lebanon committed to reforms. Targeted policy solutions will be needed for informal settlements, to ensure that poverty-stricken refugees as well as municipalities are not penalized further and tensions are avoided. Pressure on municipalities to implement reform within unrealistic deadlines and without well-thought through policy solutions and consultation will lead only to more pressure on refugees.
From a wider perspective, austerity measures, such as salary cuts in the public sector and increases in VAT, fuel and electricity prices may well lead to more desperation and unrest among crisis-stricken Lebanese. This can only result in more tensions with Syrian refugees, already seen by parts of the public opinion as unjustly favoured with aid by the international community. This will need to be taken into account by donors and financial institutions, if and when conditional financial assistance packages are discussed for Lebanon.
On a different note, intense discussions are ongoing on social safety nets and financial transfers for poor Lebanese. This is undoubtedly needed. At the same time, existing targeting and delivery platforms need reform, which will take months in the best scenario. In the meantime, current efforts by humanitarian and development actors to support basic services, such as health and education, and assist vulnerable Lebanese households need to find continuity. This needs to happen in the short term, and without any of the usual conditions of development aid, least of all policy reform.
Donors will need to support these efforts without delay. A realization is also needed that the usual “silos” do not apply any longer. At the risk of simplification, the principle has been prevalent in Lebanon that humanitarian assistance is mostly for Syrian refugees, while Lebanese should benefit from development assistance. The current crises should put this schema to rest. Many vulnerable Lebanese are now in urgent need of some humanitarian assistance or access to basic services. Without this, the feeling of humiliation and injustice among Lebanese, face a humanitarian machinery perceived mostly for refugees, will only increase.
Besides to looking at this from a perspective of social justice (in itself entirely legitimate), one can also look at it through a strict perspective of refugee protection – which depends today of both minimum acceptance by local communities, and legitimacy of humanitarian actors to negotiate and defuse tensions locally. The need to preserve this legitimacy is the main reason why, in the current moment, assistance to Lebanese as well as support to services should be delivered by the same humanitarian or development actors working with Syrian refugees on the ground, including local NGOs and grassroots organizations. It is also important to use the same or slightly adapted coordination structures.
Social peace and the legitimacy of humanitarian actors will degrade quickly if humanitarians do not step up assistance to poor Lebanese. This needs to be done, obviously, with fresh funds – without detracting from refugee assistance, and carefully looking also into increased needs by refugees. Let us not forget that, currently, a full 73% of refugees live under the poverty line.
High time, then, for donors and the international community to adjust their approach to Lebanon – and to do it quickly, from the equally valid viewpoints of needs and social justice due to Lebanese, and from that of strict refugee protection.