The last decade has seen a massive increase in doctrinal work on the issue of accountability of humanitarian actors to affected populations, coming from the IASC, the workstreams of the Grand Bargain, or individual humanitarian agencies. Pressure from donors continues to increase, and important progress is also registered in some operations. Yet, as signalled by a recent report by the Humanitarian Policy Group, “these efforts are all important, but they fall far short of a system-wide shift to ensuring that humanitarian responses are more demand-driven”[1].
I argue in this note that all these efforts will not yield the expected results until such time as we consider civil society organizations (CSOs) representing affected populations as a key player, in doctrine and in practice, of accountability. We will follow here the definition of civil society advanced by Alice Nah in her 2016 paper: CSOs are “self-organized, self-governing, nonstate, non-profit, nonprivate institutions that employ nonviolent means to achieve a public interest or good through collective action”[2].
This means that, besides of consulting and listening to affected populations, humanitarian agencies and Governments must respect, open themselves to be influenced by and even promote the collective, organized, legitimate action initiated and led by affected populations with the aim of influencing humanitarian policy. This action encompasses all legitimate activities commonly understood as utilized by civil society, including direct participation in fora where policies and programmes are formulated, as well as internal and external advocacy.
An important premise underlying this assertion is that, if we assume a protection and human rights perspective of humanitarian aid, affected populations are not a discrete set of individual “clients”: they are right holders, capable of collective action to claim their rights. Conversely, collective action is also in itself a right, in particular when affected populations are nationals of the State where they live.
Thus, there is no legitimate reason why humanitarian agencies should not, at the very least, respect this right. What is more, protecting and actively promoting this right should be, for humanitarian agencies working within the sphere of humanitarian protection, both a protection strategy and a key element of accountability.
Most of current doctrine and practice around AAP (Accountability to Affected Populations) and CwC (Communication with Communities) evolve around accountability to individuals. This is, of course, necessary (and also a right) for services rendered at the individual or family level. It is insufficent, as we will see below, for other important, collective issues such as: the general priorities of a humanitarian plan, or how (or whether) to organize IDP return. Organized affected populations may choose diverse approaches to claim this accountability, ranging from advocacy to consultation, negotiation and participation.
We argue here that accountability cannot be understood without effective participation of affected populations, including inclusion in key humanitarian meetings and fora where decisions affecting them are taken. We will also argue, thus, that accountability requires participation, participation asks for representativity, and representativity may necessitate both social mapping and community mobilization work by humanitarians, considering people of different bacgrounds and interests
A corollary of the primacy of CSOs in achieving accountability is that humanitarian organizations must, cautiously but decidedly, embrace the sheer complexity of social organization in which affected populations evolve. Most of the doctrine mentioned above seems to consider affected populations as strangely isolated from history, political economy, public policy, wider social movements or structures (such as kinship groups or tribe) and from conflict and politics. They are treated as possessing only one dimension of complexity: their internal diversity, mostly along pre-determined lines.
However, effective representation and participation will only happen with quality knowledge of social realities of affected populations, and how they evolve over time – included as affected by disasters, conflict and displacement. It goes without saying that this knowledge of affected populations must also be a two-way track, whereby affected populations have proper access to knowledge about how humanitarians operate and how they understand and put accountability into practice.
We will look at three key questions when analyzing accountability through the lens of civil society: Who are we accountable to, in practical terms? What do they do to claim accountability? And, what can we do to help them in this endeavour?
I. Who are they? The case for civil society as a basis for humanitarian accountability
When talking about CSOs, we need to ask ourselves first: where are they to be found? What is their legitimacy? A first realization here is that we are not necessarily talking of affected populations coming together, right after a crisis, to form CSOs. In many situations, there can be long-standing CSOs, pre-existing the crisis, with a legitimate claim to represent affected populations, or parts of them. This is the spirit of the formulation used in the Global Compact for Refugees (emphasis mine):
In recognition of their important work for refugees, as well as host States and communities, and in a spirit of partnership, civil society organizations, including those that are led by refugees, women, youth or persons with disabilities, and those operating at the local and national levels, will contribute to assessing community strengths and needs, inclusive and accessible planning and programme implementation, and capacity development, as applicable.
Let us look at a few examples. Back in 2004, black and indigenous populations in Nariño department, Colombia, were using divergent strategies for representation and participation. Whereas black IDPs would tend to join newly formed, mixed IDP organizations in cities, long-standing indigenous organizations such as UNIPA opened an office in the capital city of Pasto and assumed advocacy functions, coupled with community-based assistance, on behalf of affected indigenous people in their territories and those displaced in towns. Both UNIPA and urban-based IDP organizations regularly participated in humanitarian coordination structures. UNHCR supported, in different ways, both types of organizations.
Similarly, in 2014 in Eastern Cameroon, besides of situation-based structures (such as camp committees) UNHCR and other partners consulted often (or were pressurized by) at least three pre-existing structures and leaders: Ardo or traditional Mbororo leaders, Tidjaniyya sheikhs and transnational NGO networks dedicated to Mbororo rights, whose representatives also regularly attended interagency meetings.
Also in 2014, in Bossangoa in the Central African Republic, our understanding of IDP capacities changed drastically when we “discovered” that the entire local leadership of the national Red Cross Society was displaced at the huge IDP camp around the Catholic Cathedral. All of a sudden, the twin problems of distribution capacity and IDP participation in distributions started to be adressed.
The above approach certainly blurs the lines between local NGOs and affected communities, and therefore between the localization and the accountability agendas. Let us say that these lines are already, quite often, blurred in social reality, and that social reality is under no particular obligation to mimic humanitarian categories. This useful blurring of lines has perceptively been noted by the Local2Global Protection initiative in a recent paper, when advocating for supporting the implementing capacity of survivor and community-led (sclr) structures[3]. The separated silos in which we often classify LNGOs and affected communities, besides of ignoring reality, also lead us to miss out on affected communities’ implementing and advocacy capacity. This is a luxury we can ill afford.
It will also be noted that the examples mentioned above focus on forms of social organization which are traditional, based on ethnicity, or working on the development or human rights field, and at any rate well beyond the traditional humanitarian scope of work. This may raise concerns about diversity and representation of marginalized groups (in particular as regards traditional structures), as well as how neutrality and other humanitarian principles may be compromised when associating with them.
We will address the first concern below. As regards the second one let us say that no prima-facie assumption can be made of the superior capacity or willingness of international agencies to abide by humanitarian principles. Also commentators on localisation and engagement with civil society quite rightly think of engagement as a ladder of options, from which to choose according to context. It is perfectly legitimate not to participate in joint public advocacy with a local CSO if we estimate that this will compromise access. However, nothing a priori precludes working with them, for instance, on livelihoods programming.
Lastly, and more importantly, local CSOs with a relatively wide scope of work are often allies in making the Nexus a reality in the field. CSOs often arise in response to long-standing under-development and marginalization of specific population groups, which may later be a factor in armed conflict. Thus, at a later stage they may evolve into key actors in representing affected communities in fora dedicated to peace, transitional justice, durable solutions or development.
As an example, peasant and Maya indigenous leaders and structures in Guatemala in the 70s later formed the basis of the Mesas Permanentes, or the refugee representation structures which, during the Mexican exile, quite unprecedentedly signed, in 1994, an agreement with the Guatemalan Government for the collective, organized and safe return to Guatemala[4].
Evolving leadership and participation
We have seen so far participation through a somehow static prism: how pre-existing CSOs can, often, represent and advocate for affected populations. Let us now adopt a dynamic view at how leadership and grassroots organization can arise and evolve in time. Throughout history, injustice leads to consciousness, consciousness evolves into identity, identity yields pride and common recognition and these fuel both personal leadership and civil society organization.
Hanna Arendt had perhaps this in mind when she coined the expression conscious pariah in her seminal article We refugees[5]. Now, it goes without saying that conflict and disasters can fuel and accelerate these transitions, among other through the social change, dislocation of authority and contact with other social environment that so often accompany forced displacement.
Research by ABAAD and Oxfam in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon[6] has shown how restrictions of movement and unemployment have massively increased the daily workload and responsibility of Syrian refugee women and decreased that of men. This has had on women the double effect of, on the one hand, creating a feeling of “losing their traditional feminity”, and on the other, opportunities for women empowerment. At the time when the author left the Bekaa in 2020, this was contributing to very incipient, tentative opportunities for women empowerment and organization. They were exemplified in grassroots organizing against child marriage, as well as relative tolerance for female “shawishes” or refugee settlement focal points.
The long exile in Mexico of Guatemalan refugees provided also notable opportunities for women-led organizations’ fight for women rights. It is notable the example of women organizations such as Mamá Maquín, Madre tierra and Ixmucané, all of them born in exile at the beginning of the 90s but maintaining links to Guatemala-based peasant organizations. With support from UNHCR and local NGOs, they were dedicated to enhance women self-determination and promote women participation in durable solutions. These organizations worked against a backdrop of traditional and institutional patriarchy, as well as accusations of lack of neutrality. It is noteworthy how hard they had to advocate for women inclusion and women rights not only with authorities, but within the same male-led refugee organizations (the Comisiones Permanentes) formed to advocate for organized returns in safety and dignity[7].
These examples contribute to showcase the plethora of opportunities available for humanitarian organizations committed to meaningful participation, inclusion and community engagement, which we will explore more in detail below. What we want to underline here is the need for real attentiveness by humanitarian organizations as regards both CSOs pre-existing crises, and how crises can also fuel new forms of representation and leadership, including by marginalized groups.
Particular attention needs to be paid at how forced displacement both distorts and creates opportunities for social organization and representation. It is to note the important difference here between IDPs and refugees. Most of the former are citizens, maintaining full civil and political rights. This is what enabled, for instance, many IDP organizations in Colombia to participate in the drafting of the historical 2004 T-025 sentence by the Constitutional Court, re-affirming the Court’s jurisdiction over IDP rights and resulting in a massive increase of Government spending on their behalf.
Things may be, of course, more complicated for refugees, who are by definition not citizens. However, the wide availability of social media and the increased possibility for transnational networking are worth exploring in this regard. UNHCR is, for instance, working on meaningful refugee participation in high-level meetings concerning the Global Compact on Refugees, and has developed guidelines on how to promote participation in such high-level international fora.
II. What can they do? A range of possibilities
How can specifically CSOs, including those led by affected populations, meaningfully influence humanitarian programming? To the risk of being simplistic, the answer is not extremely complicated: start by asking them. There needs to be, of course, an open, long-term dialogue between humanitarian organizations and CSO in which the former may want to suggest modalities and limitations of engagement, out of their own expertise. However, the bottom line is that CSOs, in particular those are led by affected populations, must be in the driving seat in formulating proposals for support and modalities for consultation and participation. We advocate here for a participation approach which is much more attentive than prescriptive, more based in active listening than in predefined formulae.
For those loving taxonomies, there is however a way to classify the work of CSOs, including those led by affected populations, according to the spheres they want to influence:
- Internal. Work directly in favour of affected populations, for instance on advocacy for social change (e.g. against child marriage) or in organized self-help for very vulnerable individuals or families. We include here CSOs implementing resources by humanitarian organizations, as described by the Local2Global protection initiative.
- Humanitarian. Advocacy and participation in humanitarian, peace or development decision-making, for instance by having stable representation at interagency, inter-cluster, inter-sector and even Humanitarian Country Teams.
- Duty-holders. Advocacy and participation in national policy relevant to affected populations, such as IDP organizations in Colombia influencing decisions by the Constitutional Court.
- Transnational. Advocacy and participation in international fora, such as refugee networks participating at the December 2021 High-Level Officials Meeting on the Global Compact for Refugees[8].
The focus of this article is on participation in humanitarian settings. However, it is quite important to note the myriad possibilities for synergies and economies of scale between different modes of influencing decisions. As an instance, participation in humanitarian settings may give CSOs led by affected populations the clout, confidence and training necessary to enhance their direct influence with duty holders.
We have seen so far that there is no accountability without participation. At the same time, we must come to recognize that, same as we must blur the lines between affected populations and CSOs (or LNGOs), a healthy blurring of the lines between consultation with and representation of affected populations is also needed. Let us see why.
First, there may often be a need for dialogue between humanitarians and affected populations on issues going beyond the specific needs of marginalized groups, or programmes. Common examples are the general priorities of an operation as specified in Humanitarian Action Plans, or refugee or IDP return. We can and should, of course, use focus groups, representing different sectors of the population, or anonymous polls. However, using them alone will have several shortcomings. Polls undercuts dialogue, and the qualitative exchange of knowledge and views that come with it, between humanitarians and affected populations.
It has become practice in some operations to subcontract polls to specialized INGOs, often based in the Global North. If they choose to conduct polls, operations might as well work with local NGOs or even better, with CSOs led by affected populations, who can implement them and participate in their design. Thus, a transfer of knowledge and resources on consultation and participation mechanisms is already happening to affected populations.
Second, affected populations might respond to an invitation for consultation on a specific programme or approach with a counter-invitation to negotiate, in particular when there are differences in view[9]. This is perfectly legitimate and, in some situations, desirable, as it enhances participation, sustainability and mutual accountability between humanitarians and affected populations.
Actually, there is no principle reason why organized affected populations, or CSOs with a legitimacy to represent them, should not participate in humanitarian meetings where programmes and approaches are being discussed[10]. Now, it is obvious there will be no negotiation or participation without representation within affected populations. Going one step further, there will be no representation without adequate internal organizational structures, allowing for internal discussion, negotiation and decision-making within affected populations. More on this later.
Third, power needs to be factored in. A particular programme or approach might be desirable, as expressed through a consultation, to affected populations or parts of them. This does not mean that it is not going to be opposed, often successfully, by the “powers that be” within or around the community, representing or claiming to represent them. This is why, often, they need to be included in the discussion from the beginning. Once on board, they may also help “selling” the programme or approach to other stakeholders, such as authorities. The impact of this help should not be underestimated
III. What can we do to help?
Important conceptual work has been done already on analysing and creating typologies of general engagement by humanitarians with CSOs, including those led by affected populations. In their often-quoted 2017 paper on localisation, Van Brabant and Patel[11] offer the following typology:
- Funding,
- Partnerships,
- Capacity,
- Participation,
- Coordination,
- Visibility,
- Policy.
On their side, Mercy Corps uses the programme cycle of community mobilization to explain engagement, as follows:
- Pre-positioning, including community mapping and initial contact with communities.
- Assessment and planning,
- Structures and agreement,
- Leadership and capacity building,
- Co-monitoring and learning,
- Re-positioning.
This ground has, thus, been already covered elsewhere. We want now to focus on a few key problems that humanitarians may face when facilitating representation and participation of CSOs, including those led by affected populations, in humanitarian decision making, and how they could be addressed.
Map, map, map again
The first principle is: get to know social reality within and around affected population and acknowledge this reality. This means mapping tribal and traditional structures, grassroots groups, human rights NGOs, existing and emerging leaders and all kinds of networks and persons with potential to channel and even push for the views of affected populations, or parts of it. This needs to be done at the beginning of each emergency, or even preventively as part of contingency planning, and it can be accomplished in stages of evolving detail and complexity. A few organizations have developed methodologies for this work[12].
Two principles are important here. First, maximize the use of local knowledge. For this, we mean key informants or structures within affected populations, local NGOs, Government officials, local Universities. Snowball and network intensely. Acknowledge that, most probably, a local entity has already done some mapping – perhaps new research is only needed on how conflict, disasters and displacement affect social organization within and around affected populations.
Let us not forget that key informants, community leaders and leaders of affected population can often coincide in the same person: a refugee can well be a former University teacher as well as human rights mobilizer, with networks in the asylum country in particular where countries are contiguous or there are ethnic or other affinities.
Second: humanitarians should not fully sub-contract mapping since the processes of mapping and developing social capital with affected populations – which we will explore below – are not necessarily isolated, disconnected steps. The process of creating mutual knowledge and trust and laying the basis of future collaboration between humanitarians and CSOs linked to affected populations starts with direct human contact at the mapping phase.
Third: use some humility. We cannot just superimpose on affected populations taxonomies or analytical frameworks developed at the humanitarian industry’s desks, be them referring to us (the subdivision into sectors) or them (the subdivision into pre-defined diversity groups). The departure point is that society, leadership structures and power imbalances in and around affected populations are as they are, not as we wish it to be. This is a delicate, sensitive issue since humanitarian crises and humanitarian actors can also foster possibilities for change, in the form of more representation of disempowered groups. More on this later.
Promote representation. But: who talks for affected populations?
At this point, we will of course face the Kissinger problem: whom do we call when we want to talk to affected populations? Who do we invite to the Interagency meeting?
The issue is extremely complex and depends, of course, on the context as well as the issue being discussed. In many situations, there may be several CSOs competing for general representation of a given population. In other cases, or at the same time, all-purpose CSOs do not adequately reflect the diversity of the population they claim to represent. We address here succinctly the latter problem, given the importance of today’s discussions around diversity.
We propose to approach the problem through a specific polarity. The first pole is the ability and the power of communities, or elements within them, to mobilize themselves and claim a voice at the table. The second one is the need for specific population groups to gain or raise a voice because of marginalization, within and outside of their community, and the acuteness of their specific protection concerns. In a way, this approach also represents a polarity between actual power and need for power, and between social reality and a protection and human rights approach.
In the example above, the Comisiones Permanentes of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico quite successfully mobilized their community, as well as international support, to negotiate and sign the return agreements. They were, however, unable or unwilling to recognize women’s right to land titles – specific indigenous women’s rights organizations had to arise and weigh in. The point we are trying to make here is that both approaches are often necessary, and that they must be combined or articulated.
Among a myriad of possibilities to promote this articulation we will propose here two. One is promoting the mainstreaming of representation of potentially marginalized groups (such as women) within wider-purpose power structures within or around affected populations. One may argue, of course, about the legitimacy of such social engineering. Let us say that humanitarians may in many cases collectively and legitimately set conditions for the acceptance of a particular CSO as a representative – among them, of course, their ability to represent. The other side of the coin of humanitarians’ considering affected populations as real partners is that both can legitimately set conditions to each other for cooperation, in particular in sensitive issues such as representation.
A possible flip side, of course, is tokenism – CSOs may well include a few women or minorities in their boards, to satisfy humanitarians’ demands. A tacit game of tug-of-war then ensues between CSOs and humanitarians. But it must be recognized that while we play, we are talking: and while we are talking, we are creating trust for further cooperation and negotiation. It goes without saying many CSOs may have been for quite a while in their own process of accepting diversity.
As an instance, when UNHCR started cooperating with the indigenous organization UNIPA in Southern Colombia in 2004 they had already a few active female and youth leaders. It was them who insisted that in our first participative programme design workshop, female and youth leaders be given a particular voice, and that simultaneous interpretation and graphic design was used to integrate elderly women who were both illiterate and fluent only in Awa Pit. That was actually a good example of CSOs teach diversity lessons to humanitarians.
A second way to advance in the balance between actual power and need for power, and between social reality and a protection and human rights approach is to promote or support the specific leadership and organization of groups which are marginalized both by public policy and by wider CSOs or traditional leadership structures. We are talking about, for instance, women rights grassroots organizations or groups of LGBTIQ+ persons. This can be, of course, extremely sensitive. It takes skill, resources and sustainability in time. It requires a careful balance between two realizations.
One is that these mobilization efforts rarely function without some seeds of leadership or social movement within communities or better still, incipient or fledging grassroots mobilization. It is often better not to try if these seeds are not planted already, not only because of feasibility concerns but also because these movements will already represent a willingness of communities to represent themselves and to negotiate mobilization efforts with humanitarians with a minimum of leverage and dignity.
A second, somehow opposite realization is the power of recognition. The recognition, listening and respect given to marginalized persons or groups can also be additional fuel in the start of the chain reaction where injustice leads to consciousness, consciousness evolves into identity, identity yields pride and common recognition and these fuel both personal leadership and civil society organization. It is not uncommon that conflict, disaster and displacement can act as catalysts too of such chain reactions.
Humanitarians must listen carefully to such tectonic movements, when they happen, and use their power of recognition wisely. False, unsustainable expectations of empowerment can turn out destructive for marginalized groups of persons, in particular when they happen within sensitive protection contexts.
One important conclusion of this discussion about mainstreaming and specific mobilization for marginalized groups is that it is not impossible to use both approaches at the same time. Marginalized groups have, as a matter of course, a right to mobilize themselves as such, and this right must be supported when possible. At the same time, it will provide a useful counterbalance to efforts to mainstream the representation of specific groups within wider CSOs, when these take too long or are not successful.
A useful example is Venezuela, where according to context, UNHCR promotes both community mobilization of refugee communities, and their participation in UNHCR-supported grassroots groupings of vulnerable Venezuelans.
Community mobilization
We have mentioned above the need for humanitarians, as feasible and ethical, to engage in and accompany processes of community leadership and grassroots organization within or around affected populations – if we want to make true the statement that there is no accountability nor participation without representation. Humanitarian and development organizations have long discussed and sought codification of the methodologies of such efforts[13]: there is no need to delve extensively over this. It is still useful, however, to underline a few important principles.
Take it seriously.
Community mobilization, or the support provided to organized communities for their own development, is a profession. It takes skill, experience, maturity and dedication. It is important to underline that, in the way it has been described above, it only partially coincides with current AAP and CwC approaches by humanitarians – usually, community mobilization is more understood as part of development work.
There is no reason, however, why humanitarians should not recognize and integrate this specific professional profile in their workforce, to address the specific challenges arising in humanitarian crisis. What is more, there is no reason why community mobilization should not be formally recognized as part and parcel of humanitarian work, alongside and distinctly from AAP and CwC – no matter which cluster or sector we consider it as belonging to.
When working on community mobilization, it is advisable that humanitarians form alliances, when possible, with development LNGOs or CSOs with long standing, pre-crises efforts and experience in context-sensitive community mobilization. A useful complementarity arises between these LNGOs, carrying actual training and capacity building work following their own doctrine and practice, and humanitarians helping with funding, advocacy, protection and opening participation spaces for humanitarian decision-making.
When international humanitarian agencies are involved, this kind of alliances should be the rule. This is also part and parcel of what the nexus between peace, development and humanitarian work should mean in practice, through building on pre-crises community development and community mobilization work.
Community mobilization can also contribute to peace through integrating both of refugees and host communities in community initiatives to address social issues. As an example, the Great Step Initiative (GSI), a Cameroonian refugee-led organization in Nigeria, integrates 6 Nigerian nationals in its 14-strong workforce, and 37 Nigerians within its 120 community volunteers. Born to address protection issues, they contributed also noticeably to community health during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Coordinate.
Humanitarians involved in community mobilization and participation must coordinate closely among themselves. Incentives to community volunteers without common standards are not uncommon, and so is competition over particularly visible grassroots organizations or leaders for mobilization efforts. This is, of course, quite destructive, and must be avoided. For obvious reasons, there needs to be a minimum of consensus among humanitarians on representative mechanisms of affected populations at humanitarian fora, such as interagency meetings. Several models are available, from elections to fostering federations of diverse CSOs to achieve joint representation, as it was the case with IDP organizations in Southern Colombia in 2004.
Talk about ethics (and make it happen).
As said above, community mobilization is sensitive, difficult work, strewn with conundrums and minefields. Do we have the time and resources for it? What right do we have to promote social change? Conversely, what right do we have not to promote it, when feasible and sustainable, and when it supports protection priorities? Do we pay community volunteers? Who calculates and assumes the protection risks, such as threats to leaders, involved often in community organization? Which community leader is invited to the Interagency meeting? These are questions of a technical but also an ethical nature. Humanitarians must give reasoned, context-specific and ethically sound answers to these questions when engaging on community mobilization and participation.
Think of the wider impact.
Community mobilization can be, obviously, a tool to promote participation and representation of affected populations in humanitarian decision-making. It can also be thought of, or even actively designed and promoted as a tool to promote affected populations’ participation in decision-making by duty holders, including States, on policy or development matters that may go beyond the humanitarian sphere but are still relevant to affected populations. A case in point is the extensive training and liaison work that UNHCR did with IDP organizations in Colombia who participated in the landmark 2004 Constitutional Court sentence declaring internal displacement as a structural violation of human rights. The nexus is also in action in these approaches.
Protect.
Leading or participating in grassroots movements can be a deadly endeavour. When happening in sensitive protection environments, community mobilization efforts should be closely articulated with protective strategies for leaders and volunteers, including advocacy and protection by presence. In some cases, these efforts can be complemented by helping leaders and organizations develop their own network of protective alliances, such as with international human rights bodies.
Develop social capital.
Humanitarians regularly network and develop social relations within their circle but also with their key stakeholders: donors, Government representatives, leaders of development organizations. There is no principle reason why humanitarians should not develop social capital and relations of trust with leaders or members of CSOs linked to or belonging to affected populations – actually, they are humanitarians at the same title as us, or perhaps even more. At any rate, and same as it happens within Humanitarian Country Teams, these relations can help collaboration and more importantly, mutual accountability[14].
Conclusions
We hope to have established that there is no accountability without organized participation in decision-making by affected populations, usually under the form of CSOs; and that, same as they have to tolerate the peculiarities and complexities of the humanitarian industry, we have to study and accept their own. When this is feasible, humanitarians have everything to gain. Perhaps the most important gain will be somehow intangible: the realisation that affected populations are not clients but right holders capable of collective action, and that this collective action is a force without which humanitarian reform can never go in the right direction.
[1] HPG (2021), The Grand Bargain at five years: an independent report, https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/GB_2021_WEB_YabmhpF.pdf.
[2] Alice M. Nah (2016) Networks and norm entrepreneurship amongst local civil society actors: advancing refugee protection in the Asia Pacific region, The International Journal of Human Rights, 20:2, 223-240, DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2016.1139333
[3] HPN (2021), Survivor and community-led crisis response: practical experience and learning, https://odihpn.org/resources/survivor-and-community-led-crisis-response-practical-experience-and-learning/.
[4] Olivera, M. (2016). La organización de mujeres refugiadas Mamá Maquín. Rupturas y cambios identitarios, 1980- 2015, in Vázquez, M. y Campos, F. México ante el conflicto centroamericano. Testimonios de una época, Mexico, Centro de Investigaciones sobre América Latina y el Caribe/Bonilla Artigas, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvt6rm5c.17
[5] Hanna Arendt (1944), We refugees, in Jewish writings, Schocken books, New York, https://www.jus.uio.no/smr/om/aktuelt/arrangementer/2015/arendt-we-refugees.pdf.
[6] OXFAM and ABAAD (2013), Shifting sands: changing gender roles among refugees in Lebanon, https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/rr-shifting-sands-lebanon-syria-refugees-gender-030913-en_3.pdf
[7] See Olivera, M. (2016).
[8] See the refugee statement here: https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/61b85fb44/refugee-statement-delivered-opening-high-level-officials-meeting-english.html.
[9] The Center on Competence for Humanitarian Negotiation (CCHN) has perceptively seen this and developed tools for negotiations with affected populations. See CCHN, Negotiating with Beneficiaries and Communities, in CCHN-HHI Middle East Think Tank on Crisis Negotiation (2021), https://frontline-negotiations.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2021-10-Middle-East-Think-Tank-report.pdf.
[10] Examples abound, and it is a pity that little lessons learnt exercises seem to have been undertaken on this kind of participation. In two of the three field missions in which the author has participated in the last ten years, organized refugees or IDPs had meaningful participation in at least some relevant humanitarian fora.
[11] K. Van Brabant & S. Patel (2018), Localisation in practice: emerging indicators & practical recommendations, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/localisation-practice-emerging-indicators-and-practical-recommendations.
[12] See CCHN (2021). See also UNHCR, AAP Handbook: Community Mapping Guide, https://www.unhcr.org/handbooks/aap/documents/UNHCR_AAPTool_PI_Community_Mapping_Guide.pdf.
[13] Mercy Corps, Guide for Community Mobilization Programming, available at https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/guide-community-mobilization-programming.
[14] This idea is elaborated by the author here: https://southernresponses.org/2021/01/26/humanitarian-leadership-developing-social-capital-with-affected-populations/.