Note: this is the longer version of an article recently published in Forced Migration Review. The published version can be found here:
http://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/zapater.html
Tensions in the Bekaa during 2017
The Eastern Lebanese region of the Bekaa, which shares a long border with Syria, hosts currently around 360,000 registered Syrian refugees, representing both the highest absolute number among regions in Lebanon and also the highest proportion of refugees against the local population.
The region has gone in 2017 through a series of important upheavals, which pose significant challenges to peaceful coexistence between host communities and refugees. This article explores how the humanitarian and development community has responded to these upheavals. It argues that, with elections in Lebanon looming and increased pressure for the refugees to return to an unstable Syria, increased efforts by humanitarian and development actors to recognize municipalities as the natural unit for planning and coordination of refugee response are necessary to help Lebanese authorities to deal effectively with the refugee crises and ensure peaceful coexistence until organized return to Syria becomes a possibility.
A good deal of instability during 2017 has focused on the important border municipality of Arsal, which has long been both one of the most important refugee-hosting municipalties and also the most conflict-affected in the whole country. In August 2014, under pressure by the Syrian regime and its allies on the Syrian side of the border, Daesh and the Nusra front overrun Arsal, leading to a five-day battle resulting in dozens of deaths, taking of hostages by militants and a ceasefire that entrenched militant control of the outskirts and army control of Arsal town. The stalemate was only broken by successive military operations by Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in July- August 2017 which effectively cleared Arsal’s outskirts (which hosted around 11,000 Syrian civilians) of militant presence. The retreat of militants to Syria was implemented after ceasefire deals, including the release of information of soldiers and policemen kidnapped in 2014 as well as the participation in the retreat of fighters’ women and children, some of them refugees registered with UNHCR. It is important to note that armed operations were preceded by LAF raids in refugee settlements in Arsal which ended in tragedy, with five suicide bombers attacking LAF, one refugee girl killed in the ensuing violence and more than 350 Syrians detained by LAF, four of which died in detention.
Other important crises have also affected the Bekaa valley during the year. Starting in February 2017, the Municipality of Zahle (one of the most important Christian majority towns in the Middle East) started issuing thousands of eviction orders to Syrian refugees. Also in March 2017, LAF started ordering some 12,000 refugees living around the strategic Riyak airbase to evict the area, mentioning security concerns but without contingency plans for alternative settlements. In April, popular demonstrations by Lebanese host communities were held in several municipalities, demanding closure of shops held by Syrian refugees[1]. In June, a few days after armed raids in Arsal, fires devoured two refugee settlements in the Central Bekaa municipalities of Bar Elias and Qab Elias, killing two refugee girls. Rumours that the fires had been provoked by Lebanese populations, in revenge of perceived connivance of Syrian refugees with militants in Arsal, sparked widespread fear in the international and donor community that anti-refugee sentiment was now leading to community violence.
Successive crises in the Bekaa in 2017 have left the refugee community exhausted, poorer[2], more vulnerable and also filled of uncertainty and fear that the successive crises have been staged to force them to return to Syria. Response to crises have also consumed a great deal of efforts by UNHCR and its partners. In Arsal, efforts were made to advocate for monitoring of returns to Syria, which were only partially successful. Army operations were preceded by months of intense contingency planning by humanitarians, including negotiations with LAF to ensure safe passage for Syrian civilians caught in the cross-fire in the outskirts to enter Arsal town through Army checkpoints, and advocacy for the release of Syrian prisoners. After the end of hostilities, the Municipality, together with humanitarian and development partners, have developed and Arsal Action Plan which for the first time includes integrated humanitarian and development planning and participation of Syrian refugees in planning.
As regards evictions, UNHCR and its partners have conducted intense negotiations with both LAF and the Municipality of Zahle. These have included advocating for an end to unjustified evictions and, in cases where security concerns seem to provide justification for evictions, such as around the Riyak airbase, advocating for peaceful evictions as well as sufficient time to prepare the response.
Some elements of analysis
With perhaps the exception of Arsal, the crises that have affected the Bekaa valley in 2017 were very difficult to foresee by humanitarian and development actors. Likewise, it will remain difficult to foresee in any detail how the protection environment for Syrian refugees will evolve in 2018. At the same time, it is almost certain that anti-refugee sentiment and pressures to return will continue to grow, in particular taking into account the growing politicization of the Syrian refugee file in the rundown to general elections, planned for May 2018. Thus, it is essential now to take some steps back, analyse the events of 2017 and see how lessons learnt must be applied to the year to come – in particular as regards support to Municipalities as a pillar of peaceful coexistence.
One important element of analysis is that some of the events of 2017 are to be seen as one-off crises that will not, in themselves, find continuity in 2018. The military operations and the ensuing end of territorial control by Syrian armed actors in the border municipality of Arsal need to be seen as the tail end of a four year campaign to eradicate their presence from the whole of Western Syria which started in April 2013 in Qusayr and ended in September 2017 in Arsal. Thus, it is safe to assume that the spill-over of the Syrian conflict into the Bekaa has effectively ended on that date. The effects of armed conflict in Arsal will, however, continue to be felt, as the military stabilization of Western Syria will certainly feed increasing pressure for refugees in the Bekaa to return to their country of origin. A similar analysis can be made of the evictions around Riyak. Refugee evictions by LAF had actually been on the wane since 2015, as areas of military interest (of which Riyak may well be the last, although the biggest, one) have progressively been cleared of the presence of refugees.
A second important element, and the one on which we want to focus in this article, refers to the different perceptions regarding the Syrian refugee situation between the local and the national level, and the overall stabilization role that, with some exceptions, local authorities have played in the Bekaa. A striking example of this concerns how the fires that consumed two refugee settlements in June in Central Bekaa were differently perceived and responded to in Beirut and in the field. Due to inadequate settlement conditions (see footnote 1), fires in refugee settlements are regretfully a recurrent problem, with casualties and deaths (in particular of refugee children) not being uncommon. For years, UNHCR and humanitarian partners have been working hard both on fire mitigation, including training and placing of fire extinguishers in virtually all settlements, and on contingency response. The Municipalities of Bar Elias and Qab Elias responded very quickly to the fires, with firefighters and the Lebanese Red Cross personnel often risking their lives to limit casualties and local civil society and humanitarian workers then giving emergency assistance to Syrian victims and rebuilding the sites in a matter of days. At the same time, the perception among the donor and diplomatic community in Beirut was initially very different: the rumour of arson by disgruntled Lebanese host communities reached Beirut much more quickly than the overwhelming solidarity with Syrians shown by local municipalities and Lebanese civil society.
In Arsal, humanitarians and development actors, on the one side, and the Municipality on the other have reached very positive working relationships. A dedicated monthly coordination mechanism has been established. Perhaps more importantly, UNHCR and other humanitarian actors have gone from words to deeds in recognizing the needs of poor Lebanese – including some 400 former Lebanese migrants in Syria forced to return to Arsal after the start of the Syrian war. On its side, the Municipality has consistently played a moderating role between Syrian and Lebanese communities in a place where initial solidarity in 2013 and 2014 has given way to weariness, complaints over economic competition and fears of connivance between Syrian refugees and armed actors.
The situation in Zahle is, to a certain extent, more complex. Memories of the battle of Zahle are very fresh in Zahlawi minds. During 1981, the Syrian army besieged Zahle for seven months, during which the city was defended by local militias, aided by a small contingent of the Lebanese Forces (a majority Christian militia during the civil war). The city was liberated only after seven months of siege and the death of hundreds of civilians. Against this difficult recent history, UNHCR and Zahle municipality have started a dialogue in which the difficulties of hosting a large refugee population have been expressed – including a feeling of abandonment by Beirut elites, unable or unwilling (due, in part, to the political sensitivity of the Syrian dossier) to reach agreements on concrete policy guidelines on hosting refugees at the local level. Economic considerations also play a role. The agriculture and food industry in the Bekaa could not survive without Syrian refugees. At the same time, agricultural and urban landlords refuse to pay municipal tax on the substantive rent paid by refugees. Thus, those who gain the most from their presence (as opposed to those who lose, such as shop owners) are also those eschewing burden-sharing with Municipalities on the substantive extra cost they incur because of the Syrian crises, for instance on solid waste management and pressure over water resources.
Municipalities as key players in peaceful coexistence
Municipalities are in Lebanon, as in many other countries, not isolated from the political, ideological and confessional playground. They are, however, the Administration most directly affected by the presence of refugees. They have also a higher responsibility and stake to keep the peace in their territory – often resisting direct pressure from part of their Lebanese constituency, angling for tougher measures against refugees. Thus, so far they have been acting reliably and responsibly. It is, however, disputable whether the humanitarian and development community have done enough to help them in this effort – which will become increasingly difficult in the run-up to the elections. Valuable efforts are in place. UNDP and UNHCR co-chair a social stability working group, regularly analysing tensions in the Bekaa. The Ministry of Social Affairs and UNDP regularly produce Maps of Risks and Resources, a version of community-driven development designed to channel donor resources to needs identified at Municipal level. UNHCR maintains important diplomatic efforts with Mayors, Governors and LAF to maintain tensions at a manageable level and to transparently communicate that return is the only sustainable solution for Syrian refugees, once conditions allow – thereby assuaging widespread fears that the international community is angling for local integration. An increasing percentage of UNHCR’s meagre resources goes to assist vulnerable Lebanese. The repeated crises in 2017 have actively been used to increase support to Municipalities in dealing with the refugee crises. Municipal coordination bodies are in place in three key Municipalities (Arsal, al Qaa and Zahle) and in Arsal, a comprehensive Action Plan integrating humanitarian and development needs is being prepared.
These are, however, partial and relatively fragmented efforts and there a danger that without a more structural approach to support municipalities, their role in keeping peaceful coexistence will be progressively weakened and crises will be less manageable than in the past.
In a nutshell, it is key to peaceful coexistence that the international community takes bold, decisive steps to increasingly consider the Municipality as the natural unit for planning and coordination in response to the Syrian refugee crises – transitioning from a classical, sector-based humanitarian coordination structure. In particular, this needs to take into account key aspects such as assistance to vulnerable Lebanese households, management of informal settlements, dialogue with refugee communities, water and sanitation including waste water and solid waste management, local infrastructure and access to livelihoods. This will not happen without important steps being taken in this direction:
- The Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) is overall well-prepared and evidence-based. At the same time, its capacity to address local needs and channel resources to municipalities needs to be reinforced. Whereas some suggestions were made to consult local authorities in the preparation of the 2018 plan, there is also a need to recognize that after seven years of crises, local authorities don’t need to be heard – they need to be supported.
- Similarly, while current discussions around the coordination model in Lebanon have introduced some elements of area-based coordination, overall they remain a discussion about sectors and agency responsibilities. The discussion about area-based coordination is not an easy one – since it involves the difficult question of which Municipalities to prioritize. Planning and fundraising against locally developed plans need also to follow coordination. This will all demand an unambiguous commitment by the international community – including donors, who have long had in Lebanon a propensity to prioritize municipalities on parameters other than jointly identified, evidence-based need.
- Local plans arising from the MOSA and UNDP-led Mapping of Risks and Resources remain a valid model. Their capacity to channel donor funding to local development, as well as their inclusiveness and articulation with humanitarian planning, need to be reinforced. As a pilot initiative, UNDP and UNHCR are doing important efforts to integrate development and humanitarian planning in the Arsal Action Plan. These efforts will need to be properly evaluated, corrected and scaled up.
- Support to authorities in terms of coordination, planning and information management staff remain overwhelmingly concentrated in the capital. A progressive recognition of the importance of area-based coordination and planning will need to come with a concurrent decentralization of resources.
- Direct assistance by humanitarian agencies to poor Lebanese households, for instance with fuel cards and blankets for winter, remains insufficient and fragmented, reinforcing a sense of social injustice against host communities. More integrated planning is needed by agencies involved, while increasingly taking into account the role of local communities, including Mayors and civil society, in identifying persons in need.
In the seventh year of the Syrian crises, with several months to go to general elections in Lebanon, and with increased pressure on Syrian refugees to return to an unstable, dangerous situation, bolder, more decisive support is needed to Lebanese authorities by the international community. This article has tried to argue that, in a difficult environment in 2017 in the sensitive Bekaa valley, Municipal authorities have more than earned a right to be considered a key recipient of this support.
[1] By Lebanese law, Syrian refugees are only allowed employment in the sectors of agriculture, construction and cleaning and environmental services.
[2] Refugees in Lebanon are self-settled, either in urban accommodation – formal or informal – or in so-called Informal Tented Settlements (ITSs). ITSs are unplanned refugee camps with plastic sheeting shelter, making them vulnerable to cold winter conditions and to fires, and no permanent water or sanitation services. Restriction of planned settlements and more stable structures and services are policy in Lebanon, due to fear of empowering of the Syrian refugee population (harking back to the role that Palestinian leaders have played in the past in the country, including its 15 year long civil war) and also rejection of local integration. ITSs occur often on agricultural land where refugees work. Rent paid to the landlord varies between 500 and 1,000 USD a year. Average debt by a refugee family in Lebanon is 900 USD. An eviction means the loss of advance payment to current landlord, overpriced transport and advance payment to a new landlord, setting a refugee family back an average of 500 USD. Whereas refugee men rarely work, due in part to lack of documentation and restricted movement, a refugee woman earns an average of 12 USD a day and a refugee child an average of 6 USD a day on agricultural work.